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Recent Decisions
THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
PFEUFER v. CYPHERS : GIVING THE TESTATOR’S PEN
TOO MUCH MIGHT—THE UNINTENDED TAX
CONSEQUENCES OF INNOCENT
APPORTIONMENT LANGUAGE
In Pfeufer v. Cyphers,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed
whether a testator may direct inheritance taxes to be paid from his
entire residuary estate prior to apportionment among residuary legatees, even when a statute exempts some of the residuary legatees from
payment of those inheritance taxes.2 The court held that the legislative intent to exempt relatives from inheritance taxes did not supersede the testator’s express intent that inheritance taxes be paid by the
non-apportioned residuary estate.3
The court’s decision in Pfeufer was correct to the extent that it
reversed the Orphans’ Court’s ruling that the tax clause contained in
the testator’s will was boilerplate.4 However, to the extent that the
Court of Appeals concluded that the testator’s express intent did not
conflict with the inheritance tax exemption statute, the court’s decision created an opportunity for compromise of the legislature’s tax
preference for exempt individuals.5 Instead, the court should have
more directly addressed the conflict that resulted between its construction of the testator’s directive that any inheritance taxes for diverse classes of legatees be paid without apportionment, and the
legislature’s intent in establishing preferential treatment for exempt
legatees.6 In so doing, the court should have more closely examined
whether the tax language in the will was sufficiently detailed to override the statutory scheme.7 Under such a test, instead of presuming
that the testator intended to override the statute, the court could have
Copyright  2008 by Heather R. Pruger.
1. 397 Md. 643, 919 A.2d 641 (2007).
2. Id. at 645–46, 919 A.2d at 643.
3. Id. at 645–46, 660, 919 A.2d at 643, 652.
4. See infra Part IV.B.
5. See infra Part IV.A.
6. See infra Part IV.A.
7. See infra Part IV.B.
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required a synthesis of the testator’s stated intent with the legislative
intent and public policy expressed in the statute.8
I.

THE CASE

The last will and testament of James Russell Hoffmann, the testator, devised his residuary estate in equal portions to his two children,
his sister, and to Bruce Pfeufer, a non-relative.9 Under Maryland’s
Tax-General Article, section 7-203(b)(2),10 the testator’s children and
sister were exempt from any inheritance tax.11 Pfeufer, who was not a
relative, remained subject to inheritance taxes.12 However, the will
directed that any inheritance tax on the testator’s estate “‘be paid out
of the principal of [his] estate . . . without apportionment.’”13
In administering the estate, Pamela J. Cyphers, the testator’s
daughter and the personal representative of his estate, initially deducted the inheritance taxes due on the non-exempt portion of the
estate from the testator’s entire residuary estate, prior to apportionment.14 Over one month later, she reallocated payment of the inheritance taxes, requiring them to be paid entirely from Pfeufer’s share of
the residuary estate.15
Pfeufer argued in the Orphans’ Court for Montgomery County
that the specific language of the testator’s will superseded the general
rule that inheritance taxes should not be assessed before distribution
to the beneficiaries.16 Specifically, Pfeufer posited that the inheritance tax had to be paid from the entire estate prior to its apportionment, with the remaining balance to then be distributed among the
four beneficiaries, so as to give effect to the testator’s explicit testamentary intent.17 Cyphers, on the other hand, contended that the
testator’s will did not contain language sufficiently specific to override
the statute’s tax exemption and, therefore, that the inheritance tax on
8. See infra Part IV.B.
9. Pfeufer v. Cyphers, 397 Md. 643, 645–46, 919 A.2d 641, 643–44 (2007).
10. MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 7-203(b)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007).
11. Pfeufer, 397 Md. at 645–46, 919 A.2d at 643–44.
12. Id. at 645–47, 919 A.2d at 643–44.
13. Id. at 647, 919 A.2d at 644 (emphasis omitted).
14. Id. at 646–47 & n.3, 919 A.2d at 643–44 & n.3. The entire amount of inheritance
taxes due on the non-exempt portion of the estate was $14,500. Id. at 647 n.4, 919 A.2d at
644 n.4.
15. Id. at 647, 919 A.2d at 644.
16. Transcript of Proceedings at 3–6, In re Estate of Hofmann [sic], Wills No. 40866
(Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Md., Orphans’ Ct. July 20, 2004).
17. Id. at 4.
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the non-exempt portion of the estate had to be assessed only against
the non-exempt legatee’s share of the estate after apportionment.18
The Orphans’ Court ordered the tax to be paid solely by Pfeufer,
stating that the legislature clearly intended relatives to be exempt
from inheritance taxes and that this explicit legislative intent overruled what may have been “boilerplate” language contained in the testator’s will.19 Pfeufer appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.20
Before the Court of Special Appeals conducted proceedings, the
Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari on its own motion “to decide whether a testator may provide in his will that inheritance taxes
be paid from the entire residuary estate prior to apportionment
among the residuary legatees when a statute provides that some of the
residuary legatees are not required to pay inheritance taxes.”21
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Maryland law includes a two-part framework of state “death
taxes”—an estate tax on the transmission of property to a beneficiary,
and an inheritance tax on the receipt of property by a beneficiary.22
The estate tax is generally viewed as being levied against the estate,
while the inheritance tax is levied against each beneficiary’s legacy, or
share of the estate.23
Although the estate tax is generally levied against the estate as a
whole, and the inheritance tax is levied against beneficiaries’ individual shares, Maryland courts will honor a testator’s expressed intent to
provide for payment of inheritance taxes out of the residuary estate.24
A court will examine the entire will to determine the testator’s intent,
but is limited by the will’s actual language and the testator’s stated
intent.25 Therefore, to ensure that inheritance taxes will be paid from
the residuary estate, rather than from distributive shares, a testator
must clearly express such an intent in the plain language of the will.26
Where a testator attempts to not only provide for residuary payment
of inheritance taxes, but also to override the preferential treatment
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 8–9.
Pfeufer, 397 Md. at 646, 919 A.2d at 643.
Id.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.B.1.
See infra Part II.B.2.
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that a statute affords certain legatees, a court may require a higher
level of specificity.27
A. Maryland’s Statutory Framework of Estate and Inheritance Taxes
Maryland “death taxes” consist of two separate taxes due on each
transfer under a will: the estate tax, which is payable by the decedent’s
estate, and the inheritance tax, which is payable by the beneficiary.28
The Maryland estate tax is imposed on the transfer of the Maryland
estate of a decedent who, at the time of death, was either a Maryland
resident, or a non-Maryland resident whose estate included an interest
in Maryland property.29 The estate tax, as a tax on the transfer of
property, is payable out of the estate’s corpus, rather than from the
individual legacies.30 Because it is paid from the entire estate, the estate tax is, by statute, “apportioned among all persons interested in
the estate” in proportion to the value of each beneficiary’s interest.31
Maryland’s inheritance tax, on the other hand, differs from both
federal and Maryland estate taxes.32 Unlike an estate tax, which is
charged against the transfer from a decedent, the Maryland inheritance tax is imposed against a beneficiary’s receipt of that transfer, or
on “the privilege of receiving [the] property.”33 Maryland courts have
historically held that the state inheritance tax is a “charge” against
each distributive share according to its value, which the executor must
27. See infra Part II.B.3.
28. See MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 7-202 (LexisNexis 2004) (imposing the state inheritance tax); id. § 7-302 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007) (imposing the state estate tax); Bouse v.
Hutzler, 180 Md. 682, 684–85, 26 A.2d 767, 768 (1942) (recognizing the “fundamental
difference” between the federal estate tax and the Maryland inheritance tax, but noting
that each is a tax on the transfer of property); Textor v. Textor, 170 Md. 128, 130, 183 A.
247, 248 (1936) (stating that the collateral inheritance tax is “fundamentally a succession
or legacy tax on the gift, inheritance, or distributive share and, so, is not a tax upon the
estate of the donor, testator, or intestate,” and further explaining that the statute, therefore, “contemplates the payment or enforcement of the tax against the donee, heir, devisee, distributee, or other donative taker”).
29. TAX-GEN. § 7-302. The statutory scheme does, however, provide an exemption for
the transfer of some personal property if the decedent was from a state that “does not
impose death taxes on the transfer of similar personal property of a [Maryland] resident,”
or a state that allows a similar reciprocal exemption. Id. § 7-303.
30. 76 Md. Op. Att’y Gen. 392, 393 (1991).
31. MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 7-308(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007). In other words,
when an estate tax is assessed against an estate prior to division of the estate into shares,
the effect is to reduce each legatee’s interest in the estate proportionally.
32. 76 Md. Op. Att’y Gen. 392, 393 (1991); see also Bouse, 180 Md. at 684–85, 26 A.2d at
768 (finding that the Maryland inheritance tax is fundamentally different from the federal
estate tax); Textor, 170 Md. at 130, 183 A. at 248 (recognizing that the collateral inheritance
tax is a tax on a gift or distributive share, not on an estate).
33. TAX-GEN. § 7-202.
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pay from each legacy with money obtained from that legatee.34 The
legislature has specifically exempted certain relatives and their business entities from payment of the Maryland inheritance tax.35
B. Clear Language of a Will May Override a Statutory Tax
Apportionment Scheme
Although the Maryland inheritance tax is charged against the distributive shares of an estate under the default statutory scheme, a testator’s intention, as expressed clearly in his or her will, may override
this statutory tax apportionment scheme in some cases. It has long
been the rule in Maryland and other jurisdictions that a court must
examine the “four corners” of a will to construe and effectuate a testator’s expressed intent.36 Generally, where a testator’s intent is clearly
discernable from the will’s language, that intent may overcome a statutory tax apportionment scheme.37 Thus, Maryland courts have recognized that testators may direct the inheritance tax to be paid out of
the residuary estate when all beneficiaries are members of the same
class and, as such, are all subject, or not subject, to the tax.38 However, where the legatees are members of different classes, such that
some are subject to the tax and others are not, no Maryland case had,
prior to Pfeufer, examined how explicit a testator’s stated intention
must be to overcome the legislative intent to exempt certain legatees
from the tax.39
1. When Construing a Will, the Paramount Concern of the Court Is
to Ascertain and Effectuate a Testator’s Expressed Intent
It is well-established in Maryland that a court’s primary responsibility is to carry out the intention of a testator based on the language
34. See, e.g., Bouse, 180 Md. at 685, 26 A.2d at 768–69 (acknowledging that Maryland’s
inheritance tax is charged against each share based on that share’s value); Textor, 170 Md.
at 130, 183 A. at 248 (recognizing that the collateral inheritance tax is not enforced against
the estate, but rather “against the donee, heir, devisee, distributee, or other donative
taker”).
35. MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 7-203(b)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007) (exempting the
decedent’s grandparents; parents; spouse; children and lineal descendants of the decedent’s children, as well as their spouses; brothers and sisters; and certain businesses if their
stockholders, partners, or members are comprised entirely of the above-named individuals); see also 76 Md. Op. Att’y Gen. 392, 393 (1991) (“The ‘lineal tax rate[ ]’ [is] applicable
to property that passes to a grandparent, parent, spouse, or child . . . .”).
36. See infra Part II.B.1.
37. See infra Part II.B.2–3.
38. See infra Part II.B.2.
39. See infra Part II.B.3.
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of his or her will.40 In determining a testator’s intent, a court must
examine the plain meaning of the words contained in the disputed
clause, although a court may also look to “the language of the entire
will . . . [and] the surrounding circumstances when the will was made”
for context.41 A court must determine a testator’s “expressed,” not
“presumed,” intention and is limited by the actual language of the
will.42 Additionally, legally significant words must be construed in
their legal sense, absent the testator’s clear direction to the contrary.43
At the same time, a court may interpret an instrument’s language flexibly if necessary to avoid absurd results.44
In LeRoy v. Kirk,45 the Court of Appeals explained that to ascertain a testator’s intent, a court must look at a will in its entirety to
define the contextual plain meaning of the words contained in the
will.46 Specifically, the court analyzed whether a bequest of “‘all my
personal property’” included only tangible personal property or both
tangible and intangible personal property.47 The court examined the
term “personal property” and emphasized that the term was routinely
used to refer only to tangible personal property, particularly when a
will included examples of what it considered personal property, all of
which were items of tangible personal property.48 Additionally, the
court noted, the testatrix had made a specific bequest of $10,000 to
the beneficiary, but had she intended for the beneficiary to receive all
intangible personal property, she would not have needed to leave the
40. See, e.g., Emmert v. Hearn, 309 Md. 19, 23, 522 A.2d 377, 379–80 (1987) (acknowledging that the court’s “paramount concern” when construing wills is to determine and
carry out the testator’s intent); Wesley Home, Inc. v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,
265 Md. 185, 198, 289 A.2d 337, 344 (1972) (recognizing that in construing wills, the court
is charged with effectuating the testator’s intent based on the “‘four corners’ of the will”).
41. LeRoy v. Kirk, 262 Md. 276, 279–80, 277 A.2d 611, 613 (1971).
42. Id.
43. Emmert, 309 Md. at 23, 522 A.2d at 380; see also Patchell v. Groom, 185 Md. 10,
14–15, 43 A.2d 32, 34 (1945) (recognizing that when legal terms are used, the court will
assume that the testator knew of and intended to use the legal meaning of those terms
unless there is clear evidence of a contrary intent).
44. See, e.g., Wm. D. Shellady, Inc. v. Herlihy, 236 Md. 461, 471, 204 A.2d 504, 509
(1964) (permitting a flexible interpretation of terms that were obviously mistaken when
the literal construction of those terms would have completely undermined the testator’s
clearly expressed intent); Gideon v. Fleischmann, 193 Md. 203, 207, 66 A.2d 403, 405
(1949) (“If the words of [a] proviso are susceptible of two constructions, one of which
would produce an absurd result and the other would carry out the testator’s intention, the
latter construction should be adopted.”).
45. 262 Md. 276, 277 A.2d 611 (1971).
46. Id. at 279–80, 277 A.2d at 613.
47. Id. at 279, 277 A.2d at 612.
48. Id. at 281–83, 277 A.2d at 613–15.
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beneficiary this specific sum.49 The LeRoy court also explained that it
was not charged with determining the testator’s “presumed” intention, but only with ascertaining the intention expressed within the
four corners of the will.50 Therefore, the court concluded that the
phrase “‘all my personal property[ ]’” was limited to tangible personal
property, based on the “face of the will.”51
Moreover, in Gideon v. Fleischmann,52 the court recognized the
principle that if a will is capable of two constructions, one of which
would result in an absurdity, while the other would effectuate the testator’s intent, the will must be construed to avoid the absurd result.53
The outcome in Gideon turned on the meaning of the phrase “‘children or descendants,’” which the appellant had argued that the court
should construe to mean “‘children or descendants of deceased children.’”54 The court explained that the word “‘descendants,’” as a
technical word, had a precise meaning.55 Thus, it rejected the appellant’s proposed construction because it would have produced more
unreasonable results than the literal interpretation of the clause.56
Similarly, in Wm. D. Shellady, Inc. v. Herlihy,57 the court construed
a will to correct what appeared to be an obvious mistake in the classification of the testator’s stock.58 The testator’s will stated that he bequeathed 104 shares of class B stock in Wm. D. Shellady, Inc. to
various legatees; however, at his death, the testator owned 104 shares
of class A stock, but no class B stock.59 Rather than construing the will
strictly, a construction that would have caused the legatees to receive
nothing under the will, the court assigned a more flexible meaning to
the mistaken stock classification, thus allowing the testator’s clear intent—that his legatees receive his stock—to be carried out.60

49. Id. at 284, 277 A.2d at 615.
50. Id. at 279–80, 277 A.2d at 613.
51. Id. at 283–84, 277 A.2d at 614–15.
52. 193 Md. 203, 66 A.2d 403 (1949).
53. Id. at 205, 207, 66 A.2d at 404–05 (citing Gibbs v. Meredith, 187 Md. 566, 51 A.2d
77 (1947)).
54. Id. at 209, 66 A.2d at 406.
55. Id. at 210, 66 A.2d at 406.
56. Id., 66 A.2d at 406–07.
57. 236 Md. 461, 204 A.2d 504 (1964).
58. Id. at 471, 204 A.2d at 509.
59. Id. at 464–65, 204 A.2d at 505–06.
60. Id. at 471, 204 A.2d at 509.
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2. To Override a Legislative Scheme, a Will’s Language Must Be
Sufficiently Clear
Maryland courts have generally held that where a will contains
clear or explicit language as to a testator’s intent to override a statutory tax apportionment scheme, a testator’s expressed intent controls.61 Other jurisdictions have routinely reached similar results.62
Maryland courts have addressed the issue of what language is sufficiently clear to override a statutory scheme for tax apportionment.
For example, Smith v. State 63 examined a codicil that directed that the
executor pay “‘all collateral, inheritance, succession, or other like tax
or taxes’” out of the residuary estate so that all legatees would receive
their legacies tax-free, despite a statutory scheme that required certain
taxes to be charged to individual beneficiaries’ legacies.64 The court
recognized that the testator’s intent that the taxes be paid out of the
residuary estate was plain.65
In Textor v. Textor,66 the court explained that where there is no
explicit language or provision in a will overriding the statutorily established collateral inheritance tax scheme, the court will not imply such
an intent.67 The Textor court examined a will’s bequest “to pay to the
directors of the General German Aged People’s Home of Baltimore
City such a sum of money which, if invested at six percent[ ] will support and maintain twelve beds, six for aged males and six for aged
females . . . .”68 The court declined to order payment of the collateral
inheritance tax due on the charitable donation out of the residuary
estate because the will did not contain an explicit provision, or inference, that the testator intended such treatment.69 Relying on reasonable presumptions, the court stated that the testator was presumed to
know that he had to clearly express an intent to have the tax paid
from the residuary of his estate, and, further, that it would have been
easy for him to have done so.70 Because the will contained no language that could be read to indicate such an intent, the court con61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See infra notes 63–77 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 78–90 and accompanying text.
134 Md. 473, 107 A. 255 (1919).
Id. at 477–78, 107 A. at 256–57.
Id. at 480, 107 A. at 257.
170 Md. 128, 183 A. 247 (1936).
Id. at 130–31, 183 A. at 248.
Id. at 129, 183 A. at 247 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 130–31, 183 A. at 248.
Id. at 132, 183 A. at 249.

R
R
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cluded that the gift, rather than the residue, would be subject to the
inheritance tax.71
More recently, in Johnson v. Hall,72 the court explained that it
would not rely on a boilerplate clause in the testatrix’s will to override
a statutory tax apportionment scheme.73 Johnson addressed a will that
contained a standard reference to the payment of debts, expenses,
and taxes in urging that these be paid as quickly as possible after the
testatrix’s death.74 While it has a duty to determine what a testator
meant by the language contained in her will, the court stated, it is
limited in its construction by the actual language of the instrument.75
The court concluded that the language at issue, either by itself or in
combination with the language of the entire will, did not reveal the
testatrix’s intent for the beneficiaries to pay the taxes other than proportionately, in accord with the tax apportionment statute.76 However, the court in Johnson recognized that “[n]o magic or mystical
word or phrase is required” to defeat the statutory scheme.77
Other jurisdictions generally agree that only where a testator expresses clear intent may a will override a scheme of death tax apportionment. For example, the Supreme Court of Kansas in In re Estate of
Cline 78 addressed whether a judicial doctrine that typically required
apportionment of taxes if a will was ambiguous applied to a will provision directing that estate, inheritance, and other taxes be paid from
the testatrix’s “‘general estate.’”79 Beneficiaries of the residuary estate asserted that the court should apportion the tax burden, on the
ground that the will did not clearly demonstrate the testatrix’s intention for the estate and inheritance taxes to be paid solely from the
residuary estate.80 The court declined, finding that because the
phrase “‘general estate’” is routinely used to refer to the residuary
71. Id. at 132–33, 183 A. at 249.
72. 283 Md. 644, 392 A.2d 1103 (1978).
73. Id. at 655, 392 A.2d at 1110.
74. Id. at 650, 392 A.2d at 1107. Specifically, the will instructed that “‘all estate and
inheritance taxes, be paid as soon after my death as can lawfully and conveniently be
done.’” Id. (emphasis omitted).
75. Id. at 649, 392 A.2d at 1106–07.
76. Id. at 652, 655, 392 A.2d at 1108, 1110.
77. Id. at 655, 392 A.2d at 1110. Reiterating the Johnson court’s conclusion that a testator must be explicit in his intention not to apportion, the Court of Special Appeals concluded in a 2002 case that because the testator had not “‘plainly state[d]’ an intention to
opt out of” the statutory tax scheme, the legislative scheme controlled. Gordon v. Posner,
142 Md. App. 399, 409, 440, 790 A.2d 675, 680–81, 699 (Ct. Spec. App. 2002) (quoting
Johnson, 283 Md. at 649, 392 A.2d at 1106).
78. 898 P.2d 643 (Kan. 1995).
79. Id. at 645–46.
80. Id. at 646.

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-4\MLR403.txt

2008]

unknown

PFEUFER V. CYPHERS

Seq: 10

15-MAY-08

9:11

767

estate, the will included sufficiently “clear, definite, and unambiguous” language to compel that all taxes be paid out of the residuary
estate, rather than apportioned under the judicial scheme.81
Addressing a similar issue in In re Robbins Estate,82 the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire examined a will provision that directed all
New Hampshire inheritance taxes to be paid from the testatrix’s residuary estate.83 In particular, the court analyzed, among other issues,
the question of whether it could extend the will’s explicit directions
for payment of inheritance taxes to the federal estate tax.84 The court
acknowledged its goal of effectuating a testator’s intent, even where
that intent is somewhat ambiguous.85 The court noted one case
where it had permitted an inference that a testator intended his residuary estate to pay all federal estate taxes related to his death, even
though he had not specifically named that type of tax in his will.86
However, because this will explicitly directed payment of only the inheritance taxes due to New Hampshire from the residuary estate, the
court concluded that the federal estate taxes still had to be apportioned because the will did not clearly express a contrary intent.87
In the case of In re Estate of Jones,88 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania addressed whether, when one beneficiary receives an inter
vivos trust and the other receives the residuary estate, estate and inheritance taxes should be apportioned between the trust and the residue in accordance with the statute, or taken from the estate’s residue
in accordance with the will.89 The court concluded that “the tax
clause in the [w]ill was sufficiently clear and specific to overcome the
statutory scheme for apportionment of estate and inheritance taxes,”
as it specifically directed that all death taxes, including those from
property that did not pass under the will, be paid from the principal
of the residuary estate.90

81. Id. at 646–49.
82. 356 A.2d 679 (N.H. 1976).
83. Id. at 681.
84. Id. at 680–81. The court found it easy to conclude that the provision overcame the
statutory requirement that the succession, or inheritance, tax be paid by each legatee and
assessed on the property that each legatee received under the will. Id. at 680–82.
85. Id. at 681.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 796 A.2d 1003 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
89. Id. at 1004–05.
90. Id. at 1006.
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Where Beneficiaries Are Entitled to Different Tax Statuses, Clear
Testamentary Language Overrides the Statutory Scheme, but
Heightened Clarity May Be Required

While Maryland courts had not, before Pfeufer, examined the level
of detail required where beneficiaries were entitled to different tax
preferences, a number of other jurisdictions had suggested that a testator’s intent to negate a statute’s preferential treatment of certain
beneficiaries had to be explicitly and affirmatively stated.91 A 1991
opinion by the Maryland Attorney General endorsed this approach.92
A few other jurisdictions, however, appear willing to override a statutory tax preference to honor a more general tax clause, although
these courts still at least call for clear testamentary language before
doing so.93
Pennsylvania and Wyoming are two jurisdictions that do not permit general testamentary language to override a beneficiary’s statutory
tax preference. For example, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
In re Estate of Erieg94 examined a will that distributed the testator’s residuary estate in fractional shares to the testator’s widow and niece,
and directed that all taxes be paid from the residue.95 The will did
not provide any guidance as to the allocation of tax liability between
the two beneficiaries, and did not explicitly state an intent to override
the preferential tax treatment to which the testator’s widow was entitled under the statute.96 The court explained that the tax statute was
intended to advance the “presumed intentions of most testators,” including apportionment and preferential tax treatment of certain family members, and could be overcome only by a provision that is clear
and unambiguous.97 A direction for taxes to be taken from the residue of the estate, the court commented, did not clarify against whose
portion of the residuary estate these taxes should be charged.98
Therefore, the court held “that this general direction to pay all estate
taxes out of the residue [was] at most confirmatory of the statutory
proration scheme and [did] not remove the will from the application
of those laws.”99
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See infra notes 94–105 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 106–110 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 111–120 and accompanying text.
267 A.2d 841 (Pa. 1970).
Id. at 842.
Id. at 842, 845.
Id. at 845.
Id.
Id. at 846.

R
R
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In the case of In re Estate of Ogburn,100 the Supreme Court of Wyoming examined a will that disposed of property through specific gifts
to the testatrix’s foster child and his children, and directed that the
residuary estate be divided among the testatrix’s six siblings.101 The
six siblings were entitled to preferential tax treatment, while the foster
child and his children were subject to additional taxes.102 The will
“‘direct[ed] the payment of all . . . just debts, taxes, funeral expenses
and expense of administration of [the testatrix’s] estate.’”103 The
court held that allowing this general language to cause inheritance
taxes to be paid other than as the statutory apportionment scheme
instructed, thereby reducing the amounts given to the siblings who
were entitled to preferential tax treatment, would be inequitable and
clearly contradict the goal of the statute.104 The court also determined that the will’s tax directive did not include sufficiently clear
language to overcome the inheritance tax statute because the will only
referenced taxes of the testatrix’s estate and “[t]hese were not her
taxes, nor were the taxes levied upon her estate.”105
In 1991, the Maryland Attorney General endorsed this approach
in an opinion that addressed the correct procedure for assessing inheritance taxes when a residuary estate is composed of legatees of different classes.106 The Attorney General determined that, unlike an
estate tax, an inheritance tax should generally not be paid off-the-top
before distribution of the residuary estate, and should instead be calculated based on each legatee’s tax rate and assessed on each legatee’s
individual residuary bequest.107 At the same time, according to the
Attorney General, where it is clear that a testator intended an off-thetop deduction of inheritance taxes prior to distribution, deviation
from the general rule would be appropriate.108 In other words, the
Attorney General concluded that “to the extent practicable, and subject to a showing of the testator’s contrary intent, a tax clause should
be construed in a manner that assesses inheritance taxes in keeping
with the legislative intent of taxing various classes of legatees at different rates.”109 As such, the Attorney General explained, inclusion of a
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

406 P.2d 655 (Wyo. 1965).
Id. at 656.
Id. at 662.
Id. at 657.
Id. at 661–62.
Id. at 662.
76 Md. Op. Att’y Gen. 392, 392 (1991).
Id. at 392–93.
Id. at 392, 394.
Id. at 394–95.
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tax clause that directed certain taxes to be paid from the residuary
estate would “not itself [be] an adequate basis for routinely calculating inheritance tax on the residuary estate in a manner that is inconsistent with the legislative purpose in providing preferential
inheritance tax treatment to certain classes of individuals.”110
On the other hand, California and Montana have permitted
more general tax clauses to override individual beneficiaries’ statutory
tax preferences, although these courts still superficially require a clear
statement of a testator’s intent. For example, in Estate of Silveira,111
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of California addressed the
imposition of inheritance taxes on a devise of real property to charitable organizations.112 The court held that because the will provided
that taxes “‘be prorated among all of the devisees and legatees,’” it
was clear and unambiguous that the charitable beneficiaries were required to bear a portion of these taxes even though their gifts had not
contributed to the taxes due.113
In In re Estate of Morris,114 the Supreme Court of Montana examined whether a will provided a method of apportionment for state
inheritance taxes that overrode the statutory provisions.115 Under the
Montana statute, inheritance taxes were to be apportioned among all
individuals who were interested in the estate based on the value of
their shares of the estate.116 However, the will directed the personal
representative to pay, among other obligations, “‘all taxes both State
and Federal . . . out of my estate.’”117 The testatrix’s blood relatives
were entitled by statute to a preferential tax rate.118 The blood relatives urged that the inheritance taxes be paid pursuant to the statute,
apportioned among all legatees according to the amount that their
shares contributed to the overall tax, but the court disagreed.119 Instead, the court determined that the provision, when considered with
other, more precise provisions, was adequate to require the state in110. Id. at 393.
111. 197 Cal. Rptr. 121 (Ct. App. 1983).
112. Id. at 122.
113. Id. at 122–24 (emphasis omitted).
114. 838 P.2d 402 (Mont. 1992).
115. Id. at 404.
116. Id. at 403.
117. Id. at 404.
118. Id. at 403.
119. Id. at 403, 405. In other words, the blood relatives argued that the personal representative should have divided the residue balance into halves and only then deducted each
devisee’s state inheritance tax liability. Id. at 405.
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heritance taxes to be paid from the residuary estate, which shifted the
tax burden from that set forth in the statutory scheme.120
III.

THE COURT’S REASONING

In Pfeufer v. Cyphers, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment
of the Orphans’ Court for Montgomery County and held that “a testator may direct inheritance taxes to be paid from the entire residuary
estate prior to apportionment among residuary legatees even when a
statute exempts some of the residuary legatees from the payment of
inheritance taxes.”121 Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Judge
Bell underscored the importance of honoring a testator’s expressed
intent, as typically ascertained from within the four corners of the
will.122 The court explained that “a statute directing apportionment
will only be ignored if the testator clearly and unambiguously indicates that to be his intention.”123 Moreover, the court noted that
under Maryland law, a testator may direct that the inheritance tax be
paid out of the entire residuary estate, and in such cases, the testator
has effectively increased his gift, by the value of the tax, to the
legatee.124
In the case of Hoffmann’s will, the court concluded that the testamentary language clearly expressed Hoffmann’s intent that all inheritance taxes be paid from the entire residuary estate prior to
apportionment.125 In reaching this conclusion, the court explained
that because the tax would be levied on the entire residuary estate
prior to apportionment, the exempt legatees’ residuary shares would
not be directly taxed or reduced.126 In other words, the court noted
that paying inheritance taxes from the entire residuary estate prior to
distribution was “an additional gift to [Mr. Pfeufer] from the testator,
not an additional burden on the ‘exempt’ legatees.”127 Before noting
support for its position from other states, the court concluded that
Hoffmann’s clear intent for all inheritance taxes to be paid from the
120. Id. at 404–05.
121. 397 Md. 643, 646, 919 A.2d 641, 643 (2007).
122. Id. at 645, 649, 919 A.2d at 643, 645.
123. Id. at 651, 919 A.2d at 647 (quoting Johnson v. Hall, 238 Md. 644, 652, 392 A.2d
1103, 1108 (1978)).
124. Id. at 653–54, 919 A.2d at 647–48 (quoting Bouse v. Hutzler, 180 Md. 682, 685, 26
A.2d 767, 768–69 (1942)).
125. Id. at 655, 919 A.2d at 648–49. The court further stated that “[e]ven if the language were ‘boiler-plate,’ it sufficiently expressed the testator’s intention to require that
inheritance taxes were to be paid from the residuary estate prior to apportionment.” Id. at
660, 919 A.2d at 652.
126. Id. at 655, 919 A.2d at 649.
127. Id. at 660, 919 A.2d at 652.
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entire residuary estate prior to apportionment did not conflict either
with the statute that exempted Hoffmann’s relatives from the inheritance tax or with public policy.128 As a result, the court reversed and
remanded the case to the Orphans’ Court for the inheritance taxes to
be paid from the entire residuary estate prior to apportionment and
distribution of the estate.129
IV.

ANALYSIS

In Pfeufer v. Cyphers, the Court of Appeals held that a testator
could direct inheritance taxes to be deducted from an estate’s residue
before apportionment, despite a statutory scheme that permitted
some of the legatees to take their residuary shares free of inheritance
taxes.130 In so holding, the court correctly rejected the Orphans’
Court’s ruling that the tax clause in the Pfeufer will was boilerplate, but
did not adequately justify its conclusion that the testator’s express intent did not conflict with the statutory exemption for some of the
will’s beneficiaries.131 By failing to acknowledge this conflict and undervaluing the legislative judgment contained within the exemption
statute,132 the court insufficiently examined the level of specificity required for a tax clause to effectively override such an exemption.133
Rather than addressing these issues specifically, the court, despite its
statements to the contrary, applied a lenient standard when it determined that the will’s general tax apportionment clause could override
the state’s statutory inheritance tax exemption.134 Instead, the Court
of Appeals should have affirmed the Orphans’ Court’s decision to enforce the inheritance tax only against the non-relative’s share of the
estate, but required payment from the residuary estate of any other
taxes and expenses from which the remaining legatees were not exempt—a result that would have synthesized the testator’s expressed
intent with the legislative intent and public policy expressed in the
statute.135
128. Id. at 655–59, 919 A.2d at 648–51 (quoting In re Estate of Cline, 898 P.2d 643,
645–50 (Kan. 1995); In re Estate of Morris, 838 P.2d 402, 403–04 (Mont. 1992); In re Robbins Estate, 356 A.2d 679, 680–82 (N.H. 1976); In re Estate of Jones, 796 A.2d 1003,
1004–06 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002); In re Estate of Ross, 815 A.2d 30, 32–33 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2002)).
129. Id. at 660, 919 A.2d at 652.
130. Id. at 646, 919 A.2d at 643.
131. See infra Part IV.
132. See infra Part IV.A.
133. See infra Part IV.B.
134. See infra Part IV.B.
135. See infra Part IV.B.
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A. The Court’s Interpretation of the Hoffmann Will’s Directive for
Inheritance Taxes to Be Paid Without Apportionment Reveals a
Conflict Between the Testamentary Language and the
Statutory Inheritance Tax Exemption
The Pfeufer court erred when it denied any conflict existed between its construction of the testator’s direction for inheritance taxes
to be paid from his entire residuary estate prior to apportionment and
the Maryland statute’s inheritance tax exemption.136 The court concluded that the testator’s intent and the inheritance tax statute did
not conflict by relying on the principle that when a testator directs
that taxes be paid from the residuary estate, he or she merely increases the legatee’s gift and does not unduly tax the exempt legatee.137 It is generally true that a testator’s direction for payment of
inheritance taxes from the residuary estate may constitute an effective
gift increase in certain situations.138 However, this principle alone
does not justify generally requiring an exempt legatee to pay inheritance taxes incurred by a non-exempt legatee’s share of the estate
when, for example, both are beneficiaries of the testator’s residuary
136. Compare Pfeufer v. Cyphers, 397 Md. 643, 655, 919 A.2d 641, 648–49 (2007) (denying that there was any conflict between the testamentary language and the statute), with
MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 7-203(b)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007) (“The inheritance tax
does not apply to the receipt of property that passes from a decedent to or for the use
of . . . a child of the decedent or . . . a brother or sister of the decedent . . . .”).
Moreover, unlike the Maryland estate tax provisions, which explicitly allow a testator
to override the statutory apportionment scheme, the Maryland inheritance tax provisions
contain no such language. Compare id. § 7-308(k) (“Except as otherwise provided in the
will or other controlling instrument, this section applies to the apportionment of, and
contribution to, the federal and Maryland estate taxes.”), with id. §§ 7-201 to -234 (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2007) (establishing the Maryland inheritance tax scheme). Although
the Maryland inheritance tax scheme permits a testator to specify the source of payment
for inheritance taxes, this language does not similarly refer to the method of apportioning
such taxes and, as a result, does not undermine the argument that the court’s construction
of Hoffmann’s will did, in fact, reflect a contradiction between the inheritance tax exemption statute and the testamentary language. See id. § 7-216(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2004) (“Unless a decedent specified a source for paying the inheritance tax and there is sufficient
money from that source, the court may order sale of property to pay the inheritance tax on
the property.”).
137. Pfeufer, 397 Md. at 655, 660, 919 A.2d at 649, 652.
138. See, e.g., Bouse v. Hutzler, 180 Md. 682, 685, 26 A.2d 767, 768–69 (1942) (recognizing that a testator may effectively increase his or her gift to a legatee by the amount of the
tax on that gift by providing for the residuary estate to pay the tax); Textor v. Textor, 170
Md. 128, 130–31, 183 A. 247, 248 (1936) (same). For example, when a testator devises
$10,000 to a beneficiary, that beneficiary is entitled to $10,000 less the inheritance taxes
due on that amount. However, if the testator also provides that the inheritance taxes be
paid from the testator’s residuary estate, the beneficiary receives the entire $10,000 taxfree. See Bouse, 180 Md. at 685–86, 26 A.2d at 769 (explaining this calculation).
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estate.139 To hold otherwise contravenes the public policy—to recognize the typical intention of most testators—enshrined by the legislature’s exemption of many family members from inheritance taxes.140
Using its previous decisions, none of which addressed the apportionment of inheritance taxes among multiple classes of beneficiaries,141 the Pfeufer court gave insufficient weight to the legislature’s
intention to exempt some legatees from inheritance taxes.142 In doing so, Pfeufer also ignored important precedent from its sister jurisdictions when it stated that such cases generally concurred with its
conclusion that testamentary language may override a statutory
scheme that apportions inheritance taxes among legatees.143 Certainly, it is a well-established principle that clear language in a will may
override a statutory tax apportionment scheme.144 However, the few
courts that have addressed this issue in the context of legatees belonging to diverse classes have recognized the importance of the legislative
judgment to exempt certain classes of individuals from taxation.145
139. When an exempt and non-exempt beneficiary are entitled to equal shares of a testator’s residuary estate, payment of the inheritance tax from the residuary estate prior to
apportionment would effectively take from one beneficiary in order to give to another—a
result that moves the exempt beneficiary from a statutorily favored position to a position
on equal footing with a non-exempt beneficiary. See In re Estate of Erieg, 267 A.2d 841, 845
(Pa. 1970) (hesitating to forego application of the statutory scheme without a clear direction from the testator because to proceed otherwise would shift the benefits of a widow’s
preferential state inheritance tax treatment to another beneficiary who did not receive
similar treatment under the statute).
140. See, e.g., id. (expressing deep reluctance to depart from a state statutory inheritance
tax apportionment scheme that the legislature had adopted to memorialize “the normal
intention of testators” in general).
141. See supra Part II.B.3.
142. Compare Pfeufer, 397 Md. at 655, 919 A.2d at 649 (claiming that it was “immaterial
that . . . some of the legatees would not have been obligated . . . to pay taxes on their
share”), with MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 7-203(b)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007) (exempting
a decedent’s children and siblings from payment of inheritance taxes), and Erieg, 267 A.2d
at 845 (recognizing the legislative intent to confer preferential tax treatment upon certain
classes of legatees).
143. See Pfeufer, 397 Md. at 656–59, 919 A.2d at 649–51 (citing to Cline, Robbins, Morris,
Ross, and Jones, but failing to discuss Erieg and Silveira, which are uniquely on point because
they address diverse classes of legatees).
144. See, e.g., Textor v. Textor, 170 Md. 128, 130–31, 183 A. 247, 248 (1936) (explaining
that to override a tax apportionment statute, a will must include language that explicitly
demonstrates that intent or “certainly” implies such an intent); Gordon v. Posner, 142 Md.
App. 399, 409, 790 A.2d 675, 680–81 (Ct. Spec. App. 2002) (stating that to overcome a tax
apportionment scheme, a will must include explicit language to that effect (quoting Johnson v. Hall, 283 Md. 644, 649, 392 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1978))).
145. See, e.g., Erieg, 267 A.2d at 845 (noting “reluctance to abandon the statutory scheme
of proration without a clear indication that such was the testator’s intent . . . [because] the
effect of such a departure is to take the tax relief available to the testator’s spouse and use
it to benefit all beneficiaries under the will”).
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For example, in Erieg, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania required an
especially high level of clarity when a will’s tax clause, if interpreted to
do so, would have overridden a beneficiary’s statutory preferential tax
status.146 Likewise, the Supreme Court of Wyoming declined to allow
general language directing payment of taxes to deprive blood relatives
of their statutory preferential tax status.147 Instead of broadening the
established rule that a testator’s expressed intent may override a statutory scheme of death tax apportionment where legatees share the
same class,148 without considering the significance of diverse classes of
legatees, the Pfeufer court should have realized that a different rule is
appropriate in these cases.149 Thus, in stating that the court’s interpretation of the testator’s intent did not conflict with the exemption
statute, and in failing to sufficiently consider the legislative intent underlying this statute, the court encouraged future litigation by which a
non-exempt residuary legatee may benefit from an exempt residuary
legatee’s tax-exempt status at the exempt legatee’s expense—a result
likely not intended by either the legislature or most testators.
B. The Will’s Directive for Inheritance Taxes to Be Paid Without
Apportionment Was Not Sufficiently Clear to Override the
Statutory Scheme
If the Pfeufer court had first properly recognized that its construction of Hoffmann’s will resulted in a conflict between the testator’s
stated intent and the public policy reflected by the statutory exemption for some of his beneficiaries, the court should have then required
a higher level of specificity to override the statutory tax exemption.
Instead, the Pfeufer court correctly emphasized the significance given
to a testator’s intent,150 but construed it too liberally by not explicitly
146. Compare id. (requiring an “unambiguous” direction “open to no other interpretation” to override a statutory preference for certain beneficiaries), with In re Estate of Jones,
796 A.2d 1003, 1006–07 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (rejecting the argument that the will’s tax
clause was insufficiently specific, in part, by recognizing that Erieg was distinguishable because this case involved only one beneficiary of a residuary estate and, as a result, “there
[was] no issue of allocation of tax liability among multiple beneficiaries of the residuary
estate”).
147. In re Estate of Ogburn, 406 P.2d 655, 656–57, 662 (Wyo. 1965).
148. See supra Part II.B.2.
149. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
150. Compare Pfeufer v. Cyphers, 397 Md. 643, 649, 919 A.2d 641, 645 (2007) (noting
that the court’s primary purpose is to determine and implement a testator’s stated intent),
with Emmert v. Hearn, 309 Md. 19, 23, 522 A.2d 377, 379–80 (1987) (acknowledging that
the court’s “paramount concern” when construing wills is to determine and carry out the
testator’s intent), and Wesley Home, Inc. v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 265 Md.
185, 198, 289 A.2d 337, 344 (1972) (recognizing that when construing wills, the court is
charged with carrying out the testator’s intent based on “the ‘four corners’ of the will”).

R
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considering whether the testator intended to deprive his relatives of
their statutory tax exemptions.151 Because the “‘plain meaning and
import[ ]’” of the words of a will govern,152 and must explicitly state
any intention that would require the court, in construing the will, to
ignore a statutory apportionment scheme,153 the court should have
relied only on the plain language of the will, which does not support
inferring an intention to override the inheritance tax exemption.
Based on the plain language of the will, the testator in Pfeufer clearly
delineated that all taxes should be paid from his residuary estate without apportionment,154 but did not explicitly state any intention that
his relatives lose their statutory exemptions from the inheritance
tax.155
Unlike the clause in Smith, which the court found was clear
enough that it could require the residuary estate to pay the inheritance taxes,156 the Pfeufer tax clause stated simply that taxes should be
paid out of Hoffmann’s estate without apportionment.157 Moreover,
although the language in Hoffmann’s will was not boilerplate, like the
provision in Johnson, which failed to adequately convey an intent to
not apportion taxes,158 it was still not sufficiently clear to permit an
inference that the testator intended to override the statutory preferential treatment for his children and sister. Because the Pfeufer clause
did not demonstrate that the testator intended to void the statutory

151. See Pfeufer, 397 Md. at 655–56, 919 A.2d at 648–49 (focusing instead only on when
and from which source the inheritance taxes were to be paid).
152. Emmert, 309 Md. at 23, 522 A.2d at 380 (quoting LeRoy v. Kirk, 262 Md. 276, 280,
277 A.2d 611, 613 (1971); Marty v. First Nat’l Bank of Balt., 209 Md. 210, 217, 120 A.2d
841, 844 (1956)).
153. Gordon v. Posner, 142 Md. App. 399, 409, 790 A.2d 675, 680–81 (Ct. Spec. App.
2002) (quoting Johnson v. Hall, 283 Md. 644, 649, 392 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1978)).
154. See Pfeufer, 397 Md. at 647, 919 A.2d at 644 (quoting the will’s tax clause, which
stated, “I direct that all estate, inheritance, transfer, legacy or succession taxes . . . shall be
paid out of the principal of my residuary estate; and such payment shall be made as an
expense of the administration of my estate without apportionment.” (emphasis omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
155. Id.
156. Smith v. State, 134 Md. 473, 477, 480, 107 A. 255, 256–57 (1919) (involving a codicil that specifically directed that inheritance taxes be paid from the residuary estate and
that each legatee receive his or her legacy free of any taxes).
157. Pfeufer, 397 Md. at 647, 919 A.2d at 644.
158. See Johnson, 283 Md. at 650, 655, 392 A.2d at 1107, 1110 (examining a will provision
directing that “‘all estate and inheritance taxes[ ] be paid as soon after [the testatrix’s]
death as [could] lawfully and conveniently be done’” (emphasis omitted)).
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preference available to his exempt legatees,159 the court should not
have presumed such an intent.160
While the court may employ the routinely used or legal meanings
of terms to determine a testator’s intent,161 Maryland precedent
reveals no common usage or legal meaning of a tax clause that automatically renders it sufficient to override a statutory tax preference for
certain beneficiaries.162 In fact, the majority of opinions that have addressed this issue and to which the Pfeufer court could have looked to
discern such a routine usage or legal meaning require, instead, a clear
statement of a testator’s intent to void a statutory preference when
diverse classes of beneficiaries are involved.163 Thus, the Pfeufer court
should have required an explicit statement of intent where the testa159. Pfeufer, 397 Md. at 647, 919 A.2d at 644.
160. Cf. Johnson, 283 Md. at 649, 655, 392 A.2d at 1106, 1110 (noting that “under tax
apportionment statutes an intention not to apportion must be plainly stated in the will or
other controlling instrument before the legislative scheme can be ignored,” and that although “[n]o magic or mystical word or phrase is required to shift the burden of estate
taxes from the legatees and devisees to the residue,” the court needed to be “clairvoyant” if
it was going to find an intent not to apportion expressed in the will in question); Textor v.
Textor, 170 Md. 128, 131, 183 A. 247, 248 (1936) (declining to infer an intent to pay the
collateral inheritance tax out of a residuary estate where the will did not include an explicit
provision or a clear inference that the testator intended such treatment); 76 Md. Op. Att’y
Gen. 392, 393 (1991) (commenting that general phrases or the simple inclusion of a tax
clause are not alone sufficient to override a legislative tax apportionment scheme, particularly when legatees are members of different tax classes).
161. See, e.g., LeRoy v. Kirk, 262 Md. 276, 281–85, 277 A.2d 611, 613–15 (1971) (defining a bequest of “‘personal property’” to include only tangible personal property based on,
among other reasons, the common usage of the phrase); Patchell v. Groom, 185 Md. 10,
14–15, 43 A.2d 32, 34 (1945) (recognizing that when a will includes legal terms, the court
assumes that the testator knew of and intended to use the legal meanings of those terms
unless there is clear evidence to the contrary).
162. See, e.g., Johnson, 283 Md. at 652, 392 A.2d at 1108 (relying, rather, on the plain
language of a will’s tax clause to determine whether the clause overrode a statutory apportionment scheme); Textor, 170 Md. at 130–31, 183 A. at 248 (same).
163. See, e.g., Estate of Silveira, 197 Cal. Rptr. 121, 124 (Ct. App. 1983) (finding a “clear
and unambiguous” intent necessary before concluding that charitable beneficiaries had to
bear part of the death taxes); In re Estate of Erieg, 267 A.2d 841, 845 (Pa. 1970) (requiring
an “unambiguous” provision “open to no other interpretation” before a will’s direction for
taxes to be taken from the residue of an estate can override the statutory preferential tax
treatment of certain beneficiaries, given that the statute is intended to reflect the presumed intention of most testators); In re Estate of Ogburn, 406 P.2d 655, 661 (Wyo. 1965)
(requiring specific testamentary language to allow inheritance taxes to be taken from the
residuary of an estate when it would reduce the shares for legatees exempted from the
inheritance tax by statute); 76 Md. Op. Att’y Gen. 392, 393 (1991) (commenting that a
general tax clause that directs inheritance taxes to be paid from the residuary estate is
insufficient to override “the legislative purpose in providing preferential inheritance tax
treatment to certain classes of individuals,” especially when different classes of legatees are
involved). But see In re Estate of Morris, 838 P.2d 402, 404–05 (Mont. 1992) (permitting a
tax provision to override the statutory tax preference for some beneficiaries because several provisions, when read together, provided a “clear and unambiguous” statement of the
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tor intended to deprive legatees of their tax-exempt status, rather than
permitting an effectively general tax clause to do so.164 Such a requirement would have adequately considered the unique issues
presented when diverse classes of legatees are involved. Even more
importantly, it would have honored the legislative intent behind the
statutory exemption for certain legatees, which is especially important
in borderline cases where the legislative determination as to the customary intent of most testators should prevail.165 The court should
have properly synthesized the testator’s intent with the legislative intent and public policy expressed in the statute by exempting the testator’s children and sister from payment of the inheritance taxes, but
requiring payment from the residue, prior to apportionment, of any
taxes or costs from which they were not exempt.
V. CONCLUSION
In Pfeufer v. Cyphers, the Court of Appeals held that the testator’s
general tax apportionment provision allowed inheritance taxes to be
deducted from the residue of his estate before apportionment, despite a statutory exemption from payment of those taxes for some of
the residuary legatees.166 In so holding, the court glossed over the
conflict between such a construction and the tax exemption statute.167
Instead of avoiding the question, the court should have clearly addressed this conflict and recognized that its interpretation of the directive contained in the testator’s will, that any inheritance taxes be
paid without apportionment, resulted in a conflict between the testamentary language and the legislature’s intent in establishing a statutory inheritance tax exemption.168 Additionally, the court should
have examined whether the tax language in the testator’s will was sufficiently detailed to override the statutory scheme of preferencing certain legatees through a tax exemption.169 Following such a test,
testatrix’s intent to do so in that she explicitly ordered payment of the taxes before division
and distribution of the residue to the different classes of legatees).
164. See, e.g., Erieg, 267 A.2d at 845 (expressing reluctance to override a statutory proration scheme in the absence of explicit testamentary intent to do so); 76 Md. Op. Att’y Gen.
392, 394–95 (1991) (“[T]o the extent practicable, and subject to a showing of the testator’s
contrary intent, a tax clause should be construed in a manner that assesses inheritance
taxes in keeping with the legislative intent of taxing various classes of legatees at different
rates.”).
165. See, e.g., Erieg, 267 A.2d at 845 (commenting that tax proration statutes are intended to promote the presumed wishes of most testators).
166. 397 Md. 643, 646, 919 A.2d 641, 643 (2007).
167. See supra Part IV.A.
168. See supra Part IV.A.
169. See supra Part IV.B.
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rather than imposing a judicially created presumption that the testator intended to override the statutory preference, the court could
have affirmed the Orphans’ Court’s order that the inheritance taxes
be paid by the non-exempt legatee, but then synthesized the testator’s
stated intent to pay inheritance taxes from the residuary estate with
the codified legislative presumption that testators generally intend for
certain family members to benefit from a tax exemption.170 This
would have resulted in enforcement of the inheritance tax only
against the non-relative’s share of the estate and required payment
from the residuary estate, prior to apportionment, of any other taxes
and expenses from which the remaining legatees were not exempt.171
Although the Pfeufer court preserved the general principles of will construction, its decision allows non-exempt legatees to contort Maryland
law in a way that may decrease their tax liability while threatening testators’ intentions to provide unencumbered gifts to their tax-exempt
family members.172
HEATHER R. PRUGER

170. See supra Part IV.B.
171. See supra Part IV.B.
172. See supra Part IV.

